The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters
Volume 47
Number 4 Parameters WInter 2017

Article 14

Winter 11-17-2021

Commentary and Reply
Claude A. Lambert

Follow this and additional works at: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters
Part of the American Politics Commons, Defense and Security Studies Commons, Industrial
Organization Commons, Military and Veterans Studies Commons, Military History Commons, Military, War,
and Peace Commons, National Security Law Commons, Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public
Administration Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation
Commons, Political History Commons, Public Administration Commons, Public Affairs Commons, Public
History Commons, Public Policy Commons, Social Influence and Political Communication Commons, and
the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Claude A. Lambert, "Commentary and Reply," Parameters 47, no. 4 (2017): 121-122, doi:10.55540/
0031-1723.3110.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by USAWC Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in The
US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters by an authorized editor of USAWC Press.

Commentary and Reply
On “Military Force
and Mass Migration in Europe”
Claude A. Lambert
This commentary responds to Matthew N. Metzel and John M. Lorenzen’s article
“Military Force and Mass Migration in Europe” published in the Autumn 2017 issue
of Parameters (vol. 47, no.3).

I

n “Military Force and Mass Migration in Europe,” Matthew N. Metzel
and John M. Lorenzen convincingly articulated the seriousness of
Europe’s migration problem and its potential to destabilize US allies
and partners in the region. They proposed solid recommendations for
addressing the consequential challenges of mass migration but only
briefly touched upon potential actions and activities to conduct before
an orchestrated crisis begins.
Specifically, the authors did not highlight coercive engineered
migration, which is a potential problem in the European theater. As Kelly
M. Greenhill explains, “Those cross-border population movements
that are deliberately created or manipulated in order to induce political,
military and/or economic concessions from a target state or states” have
been historically underrecognized, and their threat is underappreciated
(Strategic Insights 9, no. 1 [Spring–Summer 2010]: 116–17). In short,
coercive engineered migration can be considered a tool for operating
in the gray zone—that awkward and uncomfortable space between
traditional conceptions of war and peace.
In the European theater, Russia expertly uses unconventional
warfare, or gray zone techniques, to deal with states and regions on the
periphery of its federation, and it seems they are leveraging coercive
engineered migration techniques to great effect. During and after
Russia’s violent annexation of Crimea, for example, there were reports
of ethnic Russians moving into the peninsula. As of January 2017,
upwards of 150,000 people have moved to Crimea, mainly from Russia,
but also from other Eurasian states. At the same time, roughly 150,000
former residents, out of a total population of 2.3 million people, have
left Crimea. This sudden and sizable demographic shift, driven mainly
by migration, seems to be solidifying Russia’s control of the peninsula.
In particular, liberal democracies are predominantly vulnerable
to such events because, as Greenhill states, they have “codified
commitments to human rights and refugee protection through” the
Geneva Convention. International human rights and humanitarian laws
establish “normative standards” for judging actions, obligating “states
to meet the responsibilities” (Weapons of Mass Destruction, 136).
Thus, the migration threat seems to present a larger dilemma to US
allies and partners in Europe than criminal or terrorist organizations Major Claude A.
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populations. So, how can the US, its allies, and its partners seize the
initiative, strengthen NATO’s security posture and get “left” to counter
this threat? What military capabilities might augment or complement the
other elements of national power to identify and deter this phenomena?
Lastly, in addition to the authors’ recommendation of “establishing
a planning team focused on studying the problem of mass migration
in Europe,” intelligence and systems analysis resources would be
needed to adequately assess the likelihood of a coercive engineered
migration event (Parameters, 61). Rational strategic approaches to the
problem require a common, compelling, and adaptive operating picture
to orient and counter the threat quickly. Additionally, this viewpoint
cannot be insular; it must account for the widest perspectives from the
intelligence community as well as US agencies, allies, and partners since
such migration is often concealed or “embedded within mass migrations
strategically engineered for dispossessive, exportive, or militarized
reasons” (Strategic Insights, 117). As the authors’ rightly note, dealing with
this complex challenge requires all of the elements of national power—
particularly if an event is engineered by a revisionist actor to exploit their
interests while obscuring their designs, methods, and intentions.

The Author Replies
Matthew N. Metzel

I

greatly appreciate the interest and response of the reader concerning
our recent article on the mass migration crisis in Europe and its impact
to the security posture of our NATO allies. The reader correctly
identified coercive engineered migration as a possible cause for at least
some number of the spike in migrant activity that has recently plagued
Europe. During initial research, I spent considerable time exploring
this possibility, but a respected academic advisor steered us away from
making this a central point of our argument. To be fair, Europe’s spike in
migrant activity from the Middle East and North Africa region involves a
wide range of complex international factors, some of which may include
coercive engineered migration from one or more nation-states; however,
the degree of influence or the involvement of any particular nation-state
is often difficult to quantify with any level of certainty.
The reader will note that we referenced Greenhill’s academic
concept of international actors employing “weapons of mass migration”
against their enemies. Our research identified convincing evidence that
terror groups were using the migration crisis to purposefully gain entry
into Europe for strategic purposes. There is less convincing data that
Russia (or any other nation-state) has played a direct or indirect role in
orchestrating or leveraging the migration crisis. However, we do not rule
out this possibility and invite the reader to join us on a potential future
article that explores this concept further.
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